“THE LAST ACCEPTABLE PREJUDICE”: STUDENT HARASSMENT OF GAY PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS by Bernstein, Matthew
67 
 
“THE LAST ACCEPTABLE PREJUDICE”: 
STUDENT HARASSMENT OF GAY PUBLIC SCHOOL 
TEACHERS 
 
Matthew D. Bernstein 
 
“Teachers can motivate students only if they themselves are motivated.  
They can make students feel valued and secure only if they feel valued 
and secure; they can foster enthusiasm for learning in students only if 
they are enthusiastic about teaching.  The school culture can make or 
break a teacher in the same way that the classroom culture can support 
or undermine students' efforts to learn.” 
—Deborah Stipek, Motivation to Learn: From Theory to 
Practice1 
 
“It’s my last closet.  And I don’t think I’ll feel one hundred percent okay 
until I don’t have closets in my life.  That would be my ultimate dream.” 
 —Anonymous high school teacher, Oregon2 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In the United States, where the “marketplace of ideas” is a key social 
philosophy, few Americans receive the benefits of attending public 
schools with “out” gay and lesbian teachers.  Even in an era where civil 
rights for homosexual public employees are increasing, more than one 
quarter of adults in the United States continue to believe that school 
boards should be permitted to fire teachers known to be homosexual. 
Amid a permissive legal climate that too easily puts aside the rights of 
teachers in a myopic focus on students, incidents where students harass 
teachers based on the teachers’ sexual orientation go virtually 
unpunished.  Although these cases are seldom litigated, they promote a 
closeted culture of silence in a profession that employs more than one 
million Americans, and they represent a significant fissure in the civil 
rights landscape.  The anti-gay movement, drawing on a long legacy of 
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discrimination, perversely employs notions of morality and role 
modeling to enforce a culture of heteronormativity and bigotry in 
schools.  Without adequate gay and lesbian role models, students cannot 
be active participants in the multiple social locations and spheres that 
form the lived experience of citizenship.  While states are increasingly 
protecting homosexual public employees through non-discrimination 
statutes, only federal guidance in the form of Title VII protection or a 
national non-discrimination statute are sufficient to properly shield 
teachers and institute a truly democratic American classroom.  
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE DUAL CLASSROOM 
How many of your teachers were gay?3 Your answer to this 
question is highly conditioned by the time and place in which you grew 
up, by the extent to which it made sense for your teachers to conceal 
their homosexuality, and by society’s reactions to those teachers brave 
enough to be publicly out.4  So unless you attended high school in the 
last ten years, you likely formed the impression that gay people simply 
did not teach in the public schools. 
Today, there are over one million public school teachers 
working in the United States.5  Hundreds of them are able to express 
multiple pieces of their identity, including their sexual orientation.6  We 
have come a long way since 1977, when the Supreme Court of 
Washington could find that an admission of homosexuality connotes 
illegal and immoral acts in the public workplace because a teacher who 
engages in “sexual gratification with a member of [his] own sex” has 
“made a voluntary choice for which he must be held morally 
responsible.”7  In 2013, almost half the states have banned workplace 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, and many also prohibit 
discrimination based on gender identity.8  Thousands of schools sponsor 
gay-straight alliances that fight bullying and homophobia.9  And many 
                                                 
 
3 For brevity and variety, I will use the terms gay and homosexual interchangeably.  
This paper focuses exclusively on public, secondary school teachers.  As indicated, 
the umbrella term teachers may also include guidance counselors and other school 
employees who work directly with students. 
4 I graduated from high school in 1996, and I knew of no teachers of mine who were 
gay. 
5 Figure is for secondary teachers.  Nat. Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education 
Statistics, Inst. of Educ. Sci., 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/tables/dt11_070.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 
2014). 
6 The phrasing here is mean to reflect that each human is made up of multiple identities, 
and essentializing people based on their sexual orientation negates their depth.  I see 
sexual orientation as breaking down into categories such as gay, lesbian, and bisexual, 
but also indicating a person’s wider self-conception or way of viewing the world. 
7 Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 559 P.2d 1340, 1342, 1346 (Wash. 1977) 
(sitting en banc) (internal quotations omitted). 
8Gay, Lesbian, & Straight Education Network, Who We Are, 
http://glsen.org/learn/about-glsen (last visited Apr. 17, 2014).  
Human Rights Campaign, Employment Non-Discrimination Laws on Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity, 
http://preview.hrc.org/issues/workplace/equal_opportunity/4844.html (last visited 
Apr. 30, 2013). 
9 Gay, Lesbian & Straight Education Network [“GLSEN”], Number of Gay-Straight 
Alliance Registrations Passes 3,500, http://www.glsen.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/all/news/record/2100.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2013). 
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students live with the knowledge that they may marry whomever they 
choose and receive state and federal recognition of the benefits of 
marriage.10  
Nevertheless, the public school still exists as a forum for abuse.11  
Today, more than one quarter of adults in the United States continue to 
believe that school boards should be permitted to fire teachers known to 
be homosexual.12  As has been the case since the origins of the public 
education system in the United States, the ability of teachers to lead free 
and happy lives is starkly shaped by the social context in which they 
work.  Many teachers remain closeted, harassed, or in fear of losing their 
jobs due to their sexual orientation.  The shadow of our federal 
lawmakers’ refusal to institute nationwide protections for all sexual 
orientations through laws such as the Employment Non-Discrimination 
Act hangs over all governmental employees.13  While the attitudes and 
cultural beliefs of individuals play a central role in the failure of 
Congress to protect people from discrimination and violence based on 
sexual orientation, inequity in the law also significantly molds the 
ideological landscape.  
Gay teachers work every day in a kind of legal limbo: 
inadequately protected by laws designed to stop discrimination and 
bigotry, like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act14 and the Equal Protection 
Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, and without a body of case law 
to defend their rights to speech, expression, and privacy under the First 
Amendment.15  Even tort law, a common last refuge for legal recourse, 
provides little relief for gay teachers.  Despite significant progress, 
courts have not successfully delineated the full range of rights 
                                                 
 
10 As this paper goes to press, thirty-five states and the District of Columbia allow gay 
marriage.  States, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2014).  
11 “Forum for abuse” is the terminology of Theresa J. Bryant, May We Teach 
Tolerance? Establishing the Parameters of Academic Freedom in Public Schools, 60 
U. PITT. L. REV. 579, 586 (1999).  Quotations are omitted from main text for 
readability. 
12 Views About Whether School Boards Should be Able to Fire Gay Teachers, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, http://www.people-
press.org/2012/06/04/section-6-religion-and-social-values/6-4-12-v-80/ (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2014). 
13 Employment Non-Discrimination Act, S. 2238, 103rd Cong. (1994) through S. 811, 
112th Cong. (2011).  
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). 
15 U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV Teachers are also regulated by the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (currently called “No Child Left Behind”), 
state Constitutional protections, state and federal anti-discrimination laws, union 
contracts, and local school board rules. 
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guaranteed to GLBT educators.16  Public schools remain bastions of 
conservatism, on pace to be some of the last public places of 
employment where people who identify as homosexual can live and 
work free from fear.  This paper investigates the social construction of 
the public school classroom in an attempt to explain why that is the case 
and what this phenomenon means for the future. 
Legal scholarship surrounding sexual orientation in schools is 
capacious and incisive.17  Most scholars focus on gay teachers’ freedom 
of expression outside of work, their ability to resist discriminatory 
treatment by their districts in hiring and firing, restrictions on discussing 
their sexual orientations, or constraints on teaching inclusive 
curriculum.  Little attention has been paid to incidents where gay 
teachers are harassed directly.  This kind of harassment only rarely 
surfaces in the legal system, especially when the perpetrators are 
students.  Student-on-teacher harassment occurs when hatred 
emboldens a reversal of control; students take social power and drive 
teachers out of their assigned capacities as role models, moral 
authorities, and autonomous individuals possessing inalienable rights.  
By examining the legal system’s understanding of student-on-teacher 
harassment, this paper seeks to expose the persistent homophobia 
concealed under the progressive gay rights veneer steadily emerging in 
the United States.  I argue that state anti-discrimination statues are not 
sufficient; federal protection of public employees on the basis of their 
sexual orientation is urgent and essential.  
The case of Tommy Schroeder offers a crucial case study.  
Schroeder was a fifteen-year veteran teacher in the Hamilton School 
District, near Milwaukee, Wisconsin, when the harassment began that 
ended his teaching career and drove him to court.18  In 1990, Schroeder 
began teaching sixth grade at Templeton Middle School in Hamilton.19  
Eventually, he revealed his homosexuality to his fellow staff members 
and at a public meeting.20  Beginning in the 1993-94 school year, 
                                                 
 
16 Susanne E. Eckes & Martha M. McCarthy, GLBT Teachers: The Evolving Legal 
Protections, 45 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 530, 530 (2008). 
17 See Bryant, supra note 11; Todd A. DeMitchell et al. Sexual Orientation and the 
Public School Teacher, 19 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 65 (2009); Eva DuBuisson, Teaching 
from the Closet: Freedom of Expression and Out-Speech by Public School Teachers, 
85 N.C.L. REV. 301 (2006); Kenneth L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conflict, and the 
Socialization of Children, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 967 (2003); and Anthony E. Varona, 
Setting the Record Straight: The Effects of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act 
of 1997 on the First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights of Gay and Lesbian Public 
Schoolteachers, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 25 (1998). 
18 Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 948 (7th Cir. 2002). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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according to an opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, “Schroeder began receiving unpleasant inquiries and 
crude, occasionally cruel, taunts from students regarding his 
homosexuality.”21  The harassment became increasingly brutal, and 
continued for many years.  It came from colleagues, parents, and 
students at each of the schools where Schroeder worked.22  Schroeder 
reported the abuse on multiple occasions, and school officials 
disciplined the students involved.23  However, because much of the 
harassment was anonymous, the associate principal at one school told 
Schroeder that there wasn’t much she could do.24  After he requested a 
transfer several times, the district eventually moved Schroeder to 
Lannon Elementary School in the fall of 1996.25  But after a year with 
no harassment, the taunts resumed at Lannon, and increased in 
ferocity.26  
                                                 
 
21 Id. 
22 For example, the father of a student told Schroeder, “I don't want queers teaching 
my son.”  Id. at 956 n.2.  One teacher claimed that Schroeder’s former lover had died 
of AIDS, while another called him “a flaming homosexual.”  Id. at 956.  Schroeder 
nonetheless refused to disclose the names of staff members who harassed him.  Id.  
Most of the abuse, however, came from students.  “An eighth-grade student called him 
a ‘stupid faggot,’ and told him that he was ‘going to blow [his] ... head off.’”  Id. at 
948 n.1.  A student complained that “the gay man” had disciplined her.  Id.  Another 
student told him, “How sad there are any gays in the world.”  Id. Students openly 
discussed Schroeder's sexuality during homeroom.  Id.  Other students claimed 
Schroeder had AIDS.  Id.  He was frequently called “faggot.”  Id. at 948-49.  A student 
physically confronted Schroeder, he heard catcalls in the school hallways, students 
shouted epithets at him while he was on bus duty, he received prank phone calls from 
students chanting “faggot, faggot, faggot,” and he found bathroom graffiti calling him 
a “faggot” and “describing, in the most explicit and vulgar terms, the type of sexual 
acts they presumed he engaged in with other men.”  Id. at 948-49. 
23 Id. at 949. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id.  At Lannon, most of the abuse came from adults.  One parent called him a 
pedophile, which Schroeder’s principal took seriously enough to raise the possibility 
of “proximity supervision” (restricting Schroeder from being alone with male 
students).  Id.  Another parent said, “Mr. Schroeder openly admitted at a district 
meeting that he was homosexual.  Is that a good role model for our 5-, 6- and 7-year-
old children?”  Id. Staff members and parents called him a pedophile and accused him 
of sexually abusing boys.  Id.  One parent removed his child from Schroeder's class 
because of Schroeder's homosexuality.  Someone slashed the tires on Schroeder's car.  
He received anonymous phone calls at home whose callers said things such as “Faggot, 
stay away from our kids” and “We just want you to know you ... queer that when we 
pull out all our kids, you will have no job.”  Id. 
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In February of 1998, Schroeder had a mental breakdown and 
resigned his position.27  He applied for medical leave and long-term 
disability insurance, but the district terminated his employment at the 
conclusion of the 1998-1999 school year.28  Schroeder then brought 
claims against the school district and school administrators, pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they violated his right to equal protection 
by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent students, parents, and 
staff members, from harassing him on the basis of his sexual 
orientation.29  The United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Wisconsin granted summary judgment for the defendants.30  
Schroeder appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
affirmed, and the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari.31 
The Schroeder opinion is shocking in how quickly the Seventh 
Circuit shut down Schroeder’s claimed rights, one by one.  The court 
systematically sealed off from liability all parties involved in 
Schroeder’s harassment.  It cited, as justification, a shortage of school 
resources, the state interest in protecting students above teachers, a lack 
of faith in staff trainings around sexual orientation discrimination, the 
blamelessness of minor students, and the unavailability of parents.32  It 
also injected sexuality into Schroeder’s identity, labeling him, in effect, 
radioactive.33  In the end, the Schroeder court sent a clear message: 
provided schools make a minimum effort to punish the students 
identified as the perpetrators, no one holds legal responsibility for this 
kind of harassment.  The students are blameless, the parents cannot be 
controlled, and the schools are too strapped for money and time to be on 
the hook for the wrongs suffered by their employees.  The teachers will, 
in the words of Schroeder’s first principal, “just have to ignore it.”34 
As a society, we cannot ignore this issue, because public school 
classrooms are more than simply workplaces for adults.  They are also 
discursive spaces where citizenship and social identity develop.35  In 
fact, the law of the United States and the internal rules of American 
                                                 
 
27 Id.  The Seventh Circuit noted that Schroeder had a “protracted history of psychiatric 
problems,” and, seeming to question its legitimacy, placed Schroeder’s “mental 
breakdown” between scare marks.  
28 Id. at 949-50.  The termination was in accordance with Schroeder’s union’s 
collective bargaining agreement. 
29 Id. at 948.  The court used the term “homosexuality” rather than “sexual orientation.” 
30 Id. at 946. 
31 Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 537 U.S. 974 (2002). 
32 Id. 
33 For radioactive concept, see Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere: 
Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1608 (2001). 
34 Schroeder, 282 F.3d at 949. 
35 Hunter, supra note 33, at 1632.  
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schools share a great deal in common.  The behavior of young people is 
heavily controlled by administrators outside the classroom and teachers 
within it, but classroom outcomes are also influenced by the responses 
of adults when students transgress.  Students are far from powerless 
pawns; they test boundaries constantly.  Students and adults collaborate 
to impact the working conditions of gay teachers, gay students, and, in 
fact, all students.  Their relationship is symbiotic and dialectical.  Much 
of what students carry away from high school has little to do with 
curricular content and everything to do with social situations.36  In this 
sense, the perpetrators in harassment cases hold enormous power to 
reflect and influence community ideals of gay identity, and citizenship 
more generally.  Civil rights laws, according to Nan Hunter, 
acknowledge these concepts in that they “establish a level playing field 
and eliminate irrationalities deriving from prejudice.”37  But they also 
“provide access to discursive systems that generate a host of regulatory 
norms, many extending far beyond the market.”38  These dual functions 
of the classroom—their role in the transference of cultural norms and as 
one of the largest public workplaces in the nation—should drive our 
efforts at protecting gay and lesbian educators.  
 
II. GENDER, MORALITY, AND THE HISTORY OF MEANING IN 
SCHOOLS 
 
For more than one hundred years, schools have been a central, if 
often overlooked, battleground in the delineation of the rights of 
homosexual people.  A long ideological history appoints teachers as role 
models and moral exemplars and invokes gender expectations, religious 
dogma, angst over the sexualization of children, and superstition about 
sexual orientation.  Historically, teachers who have acted in any way 
outside the often narrow boundaries set by school boards, religious 
leaders, parents, and courts (read: “community”) risked, at a minimum, 
losing their jobs.39  Young people spend most of their lives in school, 
                                                 
 
36 Unless otherwise noted, ideas in this paragraph come from my experiences as both 
a high school student and as a high school teacher. 
37 Hunter, supra note 33, at 1630-31. 
38 Id. 
39 Throughout the 20th century, schools excluded teachers because they were pregnant, 
in mixed-race marriages, thought to be Communist, and because they expressed 
pacifist views during wartime.  Teachers have been regulated in terms of the way they 
dressed, their propensity to drink alcohol or play pinball outside of work, and for 
substance abuse problems in their personal lives.  For a good discussion of these 
morality issues, see DeMitchell et al., supra note 17, at 68-79; Varona, supra note 17, 
at 29-31. 
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and the assumed propensity of students to absorb and copy the ideas, 
actions, and habits of teachers—what the Supreme Court called the 
“subtle but important influence” over student “perceptions and 
values”40—means that teachers have long been held to a higher standard 
than most other public employees.41  
Regulation of teachers based on their sexual orientation emerges 
from this larger impetus to monitor and control gender and morality, but 
these accepted cultural tropes often serve as a smokescreen for blatantly 
homophobic intentions that have nothing to do with genuine concerns 
over the education of children.  Teachers work today within a gendered 
landscape that impacts and reflects notions of heteronormativity.  
Classroom norms date back to “traditional” conceptions of family, 
which viewed single female and male teachers with suspicion and 
birthed the stereotype of the single female “spinster” and the male 
“effeminate bachelor.”42  At various times in United States history, 
teachers were systematically dismissed for marrying, remaining 
unmarried after having children, getting divorced, or other “moral 
lapses.”43 Set against these notions about proper gender roles, the 
earliest writings about homosexuality in the 1900s labeled homosexual 
educators as deviants who constituted a threat to children.44 These fears 
centered on gendered notions of family and related images of 
masculinity, femininity, and fears of deviant sexual attitudes.45  While 
men initially dominated the profession, today some 76 percent of public 
school teachers are female.46  
Inextricably tied to the gendered ideology of the classroom were 
concepts of proper moral behavior.  The Supreme Court declared in 
1952 that “a teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom.  There 
he shapes the attitude of young minds towards the society in which they 
                                                 
 
40 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1979). 
41 DeMitchell et al., supra note 17, at 69; see also Jason R. Fulmer, Dismissing the 
"Immoral" Teacher for Conduct Outside the Workplace—Do Current Laws Protect 
the Interests of Both School Authorities and Teachers?, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 271, 277 
(2002). 
42 Pat Griffin & Mathew Ouellett, From Silence to Safety and Beyond: Historical 
Trends in Addressing Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender Issues in K-12 Schools, 36 
EQUITY & EXCELLENCE IN EDUC. 106, 107 (2003).  For an excellent history of gender 
in teaching, see also CTR. FOR RESEARCH & EDUC. IN SEXUALITY, S.F. STATE UNIV., 
COMING OUT OF THE CLASSROOM CLOSET: GAY AND LESBIAN STUDENTS, TEACHERS, 
AND CURRICULA (Karen M. Harbeck, ed., The Hawoah Press Inc. 1991). 
43 DeMitchell et al., supra note 17, at 69-70 (internal quotations omitted). 
44 Griffin & Ouellett, supra note 42, at 107. 
45 Id. at 107-08. 
46 Fast Facts: Teacher Trends, INST. OF EDUC. SCI.: NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/FastFacts/display.asp?id=28 (last visited May 1, 2013); 
see also Harbeck, supra note 42, at 105. 
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live.  In this, the state has a vital concern.”47  At the same time, medical 
and psychological “experts” were reinforcing the notion that gay people 
were morally unfit for teaching.  As a result, schools investigated and 
fired teachers whom they suspected of being homosexual.  The accepted 
rationale was that since homosexuals could not reproduce “naturally,” 
they had to recruit and corrupt young people to their cause.48  Morality 
clauses in state statues, school board rules, and teacher contracts 
reflected these beliefs and affirmed homosexuality as cause for 
dismissal.49  
Underlying these anti-gay sociolegal manifestations were deep 
fears about the performances of gay teachers.50  Social angst about 
altering adult gender roles centered on the development of children.  If 
parenting is about duplicating or perfecting an image of oneself in one’s 
(heteronormative) offspring, then parental and school board worries 
about how gay adults could come to exist logically centered on 
children’s influences.51  If gay people are made, not born, it is natural to 
conceive of the classroom as an identity factory where traditional gender 
roles are cemented and laid down, held and conceived.52  In this sense, 
a gay teacher who “performed” her identity “launche[d] a personal 
attack on the heterosexual norm as well as on the stereotypical 
perceptions of homosexuality.”53  
The conflation of sexual orientation with sexual conduct 
emerged from these phobias.  At the core of the over-reading of 
homosexual aggression—as seen through worries that homosexuals 
would molest children, or try to “convert” them to their lifestyle54—is a 
deep fear of the opposite: that being homosexual is just fine.55  The 
current sociolegal discourse formed, and was formed by, the historical 
exclusion of relief from discrimination still found today in the absence 
                                                 
 
47 Adler v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952); see also 
DeMitchell et al., supra note 17, at 105. 
48 Varona, supra note 17, at 31. 
49 Fulmer, supra note 41, at 275. 
50 See Marc R. Poirier, Microperformances of Identity: Visible Same-Sex Couples and 
the Marriage Controversy, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 3 (2008) 
(performance concept). 
51 For the ideas in this section, I am indebted to a series of conversations with Professor 
Steven K. Homer.  Interviews with Professor Steven K. Homer, Lecturer, Legal 
Analysis and Communication, Univ. of N.M. Sch. Of Law (Jan. - Apr., 2013). 
52 Id. 
53 Jennifer Minear, Performance and Politics: An Argument for Expanded First 
Amendment Protection of Homosexual Expression, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
601, 622-23 (2001). 
54 Varona, supra note 17, at 41. 
55 “[T]he fear that the child may come to self-identify with a group that the parent sees 
as culturally Other.”  Karst, supra note 17, at 989. 
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of anti-discrimination protections for homosexual Americans.  The legal 
system in the United States has worked to carve away the potential for 
positive identity formation in young gay people by preventing teachers 
from demonstrating that it is okay, and even fantastic, to be homosexual.  
Beginning in 1969, as the social terrain became more combative 
across the United States, the culture wars heated up.  Homosexuality in 
schools became both more visible and more contested.  That year, the 
California Supreme Court held, in Morrison v. State Board of 
Education, that a school board could dismiss a teacher for immoral 
conduct or “moral turpitude” only if the behavior in question rendered 
her unfit to teach.56  The decision, issued less than a year after the 
Stonewall Riots, was the first significant case to hold that morality 
clauses were not automatic vehicles for homophobia.  Throughout the 
1970s, a number of courts weighed in on whether a teacher’s perceived 
homosexuality was in itself cause for dismissal, or whether there must 
be a nexus between the teacher’s identity and her fitness to teach.57  
Most of these courts embraced the idea that homosexual conduct, even 
outside the school setting, per se violated state immorality statutes and 
provided grounds for dismissal.58  The very essence of a gay teacher, 
these decisions suggested, is enough to negatively impact young 
people.59  
Despite an increase in civil rights generally in the United States 
in the mid to late 20th century, social opinion remained broadly 
                                                 
 
56 Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 390-91 (1969). 
57 See, e.g., Acanfora v. Bd. of Ed. 491 F.2d 498, 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding 
that a homosexual teacher was appropriately dismissed because he failed to disclose 
on his teaching application his prior membership in the Homophiles of Penn State, a 
gay rights group); Burton v. Cascade Sch. Dist. Union High Sch., 353 F. Supp. 254, 
255 (D. Or. 1973), aff'd, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding a state morality statute 
unconstitutional that allowed for dismissal of homosexual teacher without requiring a 
nexus between homosexuality and teaching performance); Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. 
Dist., 559 P.2d 1340, 1347 (Wash. 1977) (It is important to remember that Gaylord's 
homosexual conduct must be considered in the context of his position of teaching high 
school students. Such students could treat the retention of the high school teacher by 
the school board as indicating adult approval of his homosexuality.  It would be 
unreasonable to assume as a matter of law a teacher's ability to perform as a teacher 
required to teach principles of morality is not impaired and creates no danger of 
encouraging expression of approval and of imitation.  Likewise to say that school 
directors must wait for prior specific overt expression of homosexual conduct before 
they act to prevent harm from one who chooses to remain ‘erotically attracted to a 
notable degree towards persons of his own sex and is psychologically, if not actually 
disposed to engage in sexual activity prompted by this attraction’ is to ask the school 
directors to take an unacceptable risk in discharging their fiduciary responsibility of 
managing the affairs of the school district (citations omitted)). 
58 Eckes & McCarthy, supra note 16, at 535. 
59 Id. 
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intolerant of homosexuality.  A 1970 Gallup survey found that more 
than 70% of respondents agreed with the statements, “[h]omosexuals 
are dangerous as teachers or youth leaders because they try to get 
sexually involved with children" or "[h]omosexuals try to play sexually 
with children if they cannot get an adult partner."60  Only 27% of 
Americans in 1977 would allow gay people to be elementary school 
teachers.61 
After Stonewall galvanized the gay rights movement in 1969, 
anti-gay forces marshaled a backlash.  In 1977, singer and beauty queen 
Anita Bryant claimed that in Los Angeles, 30,000 students under the age 
of 12 were “recruited and sexually abused by homosexuals” because 
“since homosexuals cannot reproduce, they must recruit, must freshen 
their ranks.”62  Bryant warned of holding up any gay teacher as a role 
model.63  In this, she was not just successful, but influential; her 
recommendation that states repeal ordinances protecting gays and 
lesbians in housing and employment was replicated in Minnesota, 
Kansas, Oklahoma, Oregon, and California.64  In Oklahoma, the 
legislature passed an initiative in 1978 that allowed schools to fire any 
employee who promoted public or private homosexual activity.65 
The anti-gay movement drew on a moral authority that sought 
to prescribe an authoritative definition of cultural meanings in the 
classroom and also to motivate political authority to stop the 
liberalization of society.66  It was highly successful.  By the 1990s, even 
while initiatives to protect gay students emerged in some areas, mistrust 
of homosexuals in schools had grown stronger.67  In the 1996 debate 
over the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), Senator Don 
Nickles, a Republican from Oklahoma, complained that ENDA would 
allow homosexual teachers to proselytize in the classroom and promote 
promiscuity.68  Not only did ENDA fail, but Congress passed the 
                                                 
 
60 Facts About Homosexuality and Child Molestation, SEXUAL ORIENTATION: SCI., 
EDUC., & POL’Y, DEP’T OF PSYCHOLOGY UNIV. OF CAL., 
http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/rainbow/html/facts_molestation.html (last visited Feb. 
21, 2014). 
61 Id. 
62 Varona, supra note 17, at 31. 
63 Id.; see also Griffin & Ouellett, supra note 42, at 107-08. 
64 Varona, supra note 17, at 31. 
65 Id. The Tenth Circuit found this statute unconstitutional in 1984; see Nat'l Gay Task 
Force v. Bd. of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Bd. of 
Educ.. v. Nat'l Gay Task Force, 470 U.S. 903 (1985). 
66 See Karst, supra note 17, at 977. 
67 Griffin & Ouellett, supra note 42, at 110.  
68 Varona, supra note 17, at 25-26. 
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Defense of Marriage Act that same year.69  The political right has 
continued to find vast success in its ability to “mobilize cultural 
constituencies” by focusing on the socialization of children.70 
In the last twenty years, as in other areas of public employment 
and civil rights, gay teachers have increasingly won victories while 
often suffering setbacks.  In an era in which the Supreme Court has 
found substantive due process privacy rights in the areas of procreation, 
marriage, abortion, and the use of contraception, the Court has also 
increased its protections of sexuality and sexual orientation.71  The 
watershed decisions in Romer v. Evans72 and Lawrence v. Texas73 
liberated gay people from the reach of laws meant to punish them simply 
on the basis of their identity.  Where once homosexuality was 
completely invisible in public education, now there is a limited 
tolerance.  Nonetheless, today thirty-seven states have statutes that 
make immorality—a universal signifier for non-heterosexuality—a 
legitimate reason for teacher dismissal.74  In many schools, gay teachers 
have no fear of persecution, but homophobia is increasingly hidden 
behind selectively-applied notions of heteronormative morality and 
ideation about “role models.”75  While the closet door remains shut for 
many teachers who work in unforgiving communities, students have a 
way of prying that door open.  
 
III. ILL-FITTING PRECEDENT 
Harassment is a form of discrimination, which, legally speaking, 
only exists if it is tied to protected class status.76  Among students, 
identity-based harassment is simply called bullying, and one would be 
hard pressed to find anyone who explicitly tolerates it.  But against 
adults, our national laws condone bullying if it is not based on race, 
                                                 
 
69 Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
70 Karst, supra note 17, at 969, 971. 
71 DeMitchell et al., supra note 17, at 97-101. 
72 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (finding that the amendment to the Colorado 
Constitution banning protections for homosexuals violated Equal Protection Clause). 
73 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding unconstitutional the Texas ban on 
homosexual sodomy and overturning Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). 
74 DeMitchell et al., supra note 17, at 79; see also What Are the Main Rights Teachers 
Have in the United States, and Why is it Important..., ENOTES, 
http://www.enotes.com/education-reference/teachers-rights (last visited Feb. 21, 
2014). 
75 See, e.g., Holt v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 685 So. 2d 501 (La. Ct. App. 1996) 
(affirming reversal of dismissal of female teacher for sleeping with female student at 
slumber party and giving student gifts). 
76 Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/harassment.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
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color, religion, sex, or national origin.77  When students harass teachers, 
they benefit from an added layer of protection of their anti-gay animus 
because students are subject to more lenient legal standards when it 
comes to their words and behavior.  In effect, the law shields these 
student proxies from responsibility for bullying adults and protects 
supervisors and parents from wrongs they did not directly commit.  This 
phenomenon is due to a shallow understanding of schools and to the 
historical homophobia, outlined above, camouflaged beneath the 
concern for vulnerable young people.  Responsibility for stopping the 
harassment too often falls back on teachers, with disastrous results. 
The most important federal legislation protecting discrimination 
in the workplace is the Civil Rights Act of 1964.78  Title VII of the act 
makes it unlawful “to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”79  While Title VII has been successful in preventing workplace 
discrimination for the protected classes it explicitly mentions, plaintiffs 
seeking safeguards on the basis of their sexual orientation have not been 
able to rely on Title VII.  Courts have “uniformly rejected the notion 
that either sexual orientation or gender identity” are analyzed within the 
protections of Title VII.80  Judicial interpretation of Title VII has shifted 
radically since the act’s passage, and some plaintiffs in non-teaching 
fields have been successful in bringing Title VII “because of…sex” 
claims for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.81  However, 
no teacher has successfully utilized Title VII in bringing a sexual 
orientation harassment claim, and few have bothered to try.  What 
should be the cornerstone of available remedies is instead a dead end. 
Courts have increasingly muddied, rather than clarified, the 
exact meaning of “because of…sex” discrimination, often failing to 
articulate the important differences and overlaps between sexual 
harassment, gender discrimination, and discrimination based on sexual 
orientation in decisions that too often run against homosexual 
plaintiffs.82  Under Title VII, courts place gay people in a bind: on one 
                                                 
 
77 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
78 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CARLOS A. BALL & JANE S. SCHACTER, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 448 (West Publishing, 3rd ed. 
2008). 
79 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
80 Rubenstein et al., supra note 78, at 449. 
81 See, e.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that 
issue of material fact existed as to whether harassment of gay male employee was due 
to homosexuality). 
82 See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding 
that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII); Price Waterhouse v. 
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hand, those who present stereotypically find more success in court than 
those who do not; Title VII incentivizes plaintiffs to “act gay.”  If they 
do not, their harassers can easily claim some other, non-protected basis 
for their actions.83  On the other hand, if plaintiffs do present 
stereotypically and it is clear the discrimination occurred for this reason, 
courts are likely to limit the legal basis of the harassment to sexual 
orientation, which, in and of itself, is not a basis for a Title VII claim.84 
The fact that none of the teachers facing student harassment in the cases 
analyzed here even attempted to rely on Title VII exposes it as a 
selective administrator of justice. 
 Gay teachers have had some success relying on 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, which creates a cause of action for constitutional violations.85  
Using Section 1983, teachers can seek protections and damages under 
the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, the right to free 
speech and expression, and the right to privacy.  Declarations of 
homosexuality (whether the teacher intentionally comes out or 
unintentionally “is outed” by someone else) are often the spark for 
harassment.86  First Amendment speech and expression claims, applied 
through Section 1983, provide one avenue to protect gay teachers in 
these circumstances.  In fact, Theresa Bryant calls the First Amendment, 
“the only protection for teachers, if such protection exists.”87  Jennifer 
Minear goes even further, arguing that all homosexual identity should 
be seen as expression and thus protected by the First Amendment.88  One 
advantage to expression claims is certainly that, in contrast to equal 
                                                 
 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that the company who denied a woman 
promotion, telling her to go to “charm school” and act more feminine, stereotyped her 
in violation of Title VII); Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (affirming, under Title VII, casino’s right to compel female employee to 
wear makeup); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding 
that lesbian hairdresser who claimed discrimination and gender stereotyping under 
Title VII was fired for other reasons); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206 
(9th Cir. 2001) (affirming that harassment of hotel employee based on his sexual 
orientation was not actionable under Title VII). 
83 See Dawson, 398 F.3d at 218. 
84 “Rene did nothing to show the district court that the harassment was based on his 
gender.  Instead, he stated quite plainly that the question presented was whether the 
conduct he alleged ‘is prohibited by Title VII even though it was directed at [him] 
because of his sexual orientation.’”  Rene, 243 F.3d at 1210. 
85 “Every person who, under color of any statute. . . subjects. . . any citizen of the 
United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit 
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . ” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
86 See Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1281 (D. Utah 1998). 
87 Bryant, supra note 11, at 590. 
88 Minear, supra note 53, at 626. 
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protection or Title VII, they nominally apply equally to people of all 
sexual orientations.89 
The free speech and expression approach, however, does not 
serve to protect teachers harassed by students.  Speech and expression 
claims depend upon a two-step process: first, the teacher must be 
publicly out(ed), and second, the school or school board must take 
identifiable, aggressive actions to limit the teacher’s expression.  Once 
a gay teacher engages in some kind of out expression, under First 
Amendment law, courts analyze three prongs: the extent to which that 
performance is a matter of “public concern,”90 whether it is “disruptive” 
to the school day,91 or whether it is “reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”92  Leaving aside the insult of applying these 
tests to a person’s basic identity, scenarios such as these do not fit 
situations in which students harass teachers; in those cases, the teacher 
is often not out prior to the harassment, and the school board most 
commonly does not act.  
Because First Amendment jurisprudence places a duty on 
homosexuals to officially “come out” in some symbolic or substantive 
way before assigning protection, it turns the closet inside out.  It places 
the burden on the victim rather than the perpetrator.  While it is an 
admirable goal that all gay and lesbian teachers freely express who they 
are, to require “out” behavior prior to legal protection reinforces 
stereotypes that somehow sexuality is more essential in the identities of 
gay people than it is for heterosexuals.  Since heterosexuality is the 
default, invisible identity, no straight person needs to make a show of 
declaring his sexual preference—heterosexuality is simply assumed.  
Moreover, it is not relevant whether teachers harassed for their sexual 
orientation actually are gay or not: the salient issue is that the 
perpetrators have decided they are.  
Under the First Amendment, it may also be difficult to prove that 
a school administration acted against a teacher because of sexual 
orientation or for another reason.  Wendy Weaver’s case demonstrates 
many of the drawbacks to First Amendment claims, despite the fact that 
she is perhaps the most successful plaintiff in a harassment case.  
Weaver was a veteran teacher and volleyball coach at Spanish Fork 
                                                 
 
89 Equal protection sets up a hierarchy of protected classes and holds race as more 
important than sexual orientation, while Title VII simply excludes sexual orientation 
protections altogether.  
90 Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
91 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969). 
92 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273, (1988). 
2014]            THE LAST ACCEPTABLE PREJUDICE 83 
 
High School in Spanish Fork, Utah, with an unblemished reputation.93  
When a student and volleyball player asked Weaver if she was gay, 
Weaver said simply, “yes.”94  Parents and students suddenly began 
complaining about her and Weaver’s sexual orientation became a topic 
openly discussed by the principal, the school board, and even Weaver’s 
ex-husband.95  One of her players and that player’s parents told the 
principal that the girl would not play under Weaver.96  Weaver was then 
let go as volleyball coach and told that she could not discuss her 
“homosexual orientation or lifestyle” at school, and “if students, staff 
members, or parents of students ask about your sexual orientation or 
anything concerning the subject, you shall tell them that the subject is 
private and personal and inappropriate to discuss with them.”97  The 
district reminded Weaver that she was “always perceived by the student 
as a teacher, authority figure and role model.”98  Weaver brought suit 
under Section 1983, alleging that the school had violated her right to 
free speech under the First Amendment, and that her dismissal as coach 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.99  She prevailed on summary 
judgment on all counts, with the court finding that her sexual orientation 
was “a matter of public concern.”100 
It is unclear, however, to what extent the Weaver decision 
should represent a victory in teacher harassment cases.  Weaver is less 
about a teacher’s right to assert her sexuality freely than it is about a 
school’s ability to publicly shame a teacher as a form of harassment.  In 
this case, rather than any student directly attacking Weaver, the school 
board and parents relied on the school administration to hold the nucleus 
of the homophobia.  If the school had not taken clear and documented 
steps, in writing, to suppress Weaver’s expression of her sexual 
orientation—if, instead, it had stood by passively while others inflicted 
the damage—Weaver would have had shaky legal ground on which to 
stand.  Wendy Weaver’s case is a useful paradigm to show just how 
                                                 
 
93 As a teacher, she consistently received excellent evaluations.  As a coach, Weaver 
led her team to four state championships.  Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 
1279, 1280 (D. Utah 1998). 
94 Id. at 1281. 
95 Id. at 1286. 
96 Id. at 1281. 
97 Id. at 1281-82. 
98 Id. at 1282. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 1284.  But see Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., Montgomery Cnty., 
Ohio, 730 F.2d 444, 449 (6th Cir. 1984) (declaring that teacher’s sexual orientation 
was not a matter of public concern). 
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direct school involvement in harassment must be to constitute 
discrimination.101  
 
IV. JUDICIAL HOMOPHOBIA MADE PLAIN: THE CASE OF TOMMY 
SCHROEDER 
 
Tommy Schroeder’s case, by contrast, symbolizes the enormous 
power students hold to express community homophobia and come away 
virtually without reproach.  The Seventh Circuit handed down 
Schroeder in 2002, six years after Romer102 and one year before 
Lawrence.103  These two cases opened the door to fundamental rights 
for gay and lesbian Americans by declaring, for the first time, that 
government animus against homosexuals was irrational.104  However, 
as Katherine M. Franke explains, Romer and Lawrence also “[did] little 
to open up new forms of public and private sexual intelligibility that are 
not always already domestinormative.…The world post-Lawrence 
remains invested in forms of social membership and, indeed, citizenship 
that are structurally identified with domesticated heterosexual marriage 
and intimacy.”105  Tommy Schroeder fell victim to a court only willing 
to go so far in recognizing the legitimacy of homosexuality.  His case 
demonstrates the limited reach of the Romer-Lawrence era. 
As mentioned in the Introduction above, Schroeder took what 
feels like an intuitive path to face his district’s poor response to student 
                                                 
 
101 Weaver’s foes also used the courts themselves to harass her.  In a separate case 
brought against her shortly after she filed her own complaint, a group of parents calling 
themselves the “Citizens of Nebo School District for Moral and Legal Values” accused 
Weaver of violating various state statutes concerning the conduct of teachers.  Miller 
v. Weaver, 66 P.3d 592, 594 (2003).  The group accused Weaver of administering 
personality tests to her students, discussing the results of those tests in class, requiring 
her students to interpret their dreams in class, and disparaging the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints.  The group also said Weaver “encouraged students to 
question traditional sources of authority and determine for themselves whether 
alternative ‘lifestyles’ are right or wrong.”  Id.  The Utah Supreme Court eventually 
dismissed all complaints, granted Weaver her costs, and agreed with the district court’s 
assessment of the plaintiffs’ “utter failure to address the substance of the [district 
court's] ruling.”  Id. 
102 See supra note 72. 
103 See supra note 73. 
104 “The Romer decision highlights a judicial shift from considering animus against 
homosexuals to be an acceptable government rationale, to treating it like any other 
racial, ethnic, or religious bias.”  DuBuisson, supra note 17, at 329 (citing Palmore v. 
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (holding “private biases may be outside the reach of 
the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect”)). 
105 Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1399, 1415-16 (2004). 
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harassment: he brought a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.106  Seen as the centerpiece of 
constitutional protection of individual rights, Section One of the 
Fourteenth Amendment avers that no state shall “deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”107  Equal 
protection requires that all groups of people be treated similarly.108  If 
the state makes a law that more heavily burdens one classification of 
people above another, it must demonstrate at minimum a rational basis 
for doing so.  If the classification is deemed protected, the state has a 
higher burden to meet in its justification for the imbalance in treatment.  
Courts have not identified sexual orientation as a protected class.  
In Schroeder, the court applied rational basis review, citing both 
Romer and Bowers v. Hardwick.109  In order to establish an equal 
protection violation, then, the court found that Schroeder must show that 
the defendants “(1) treated him differently from others who were 
similarly situated, (2) intentionally treated him differently because of 
his membership in the class to which he belonged (i.e., homosexuals), 
and (3) . . . that the discriminatory intent was not rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.”110  The court attacked Schroeder’s case on all 
three prongs and found that a rational basis for the district’s treatment 
of him did exist.111 
First, the court invalidated Schroeder’s definition of “similarly 
situated” and the significance of his class membership.112  Lacking any 
clear examples of other out teachers that the district treated differently, 
Schroeder based his disparate treatment claim, in part, on the fact that 
administrators had handled a spate of racial incidents at the school much 
more urgently than they had his situation.113  The court found, however, 
                                                 
 
106 Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 948 (7th Cir. 2002). 
107 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
108 For equal protection analysis, see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 
(1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
109 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding Georgia’s anti-sodomy 
statute).  Overruled one year later in Lawrence. 
110 Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 950 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal 
citations omitted). 
111 Id. at 959. 
112 Id. at 953. 
113 “Schroeder would have us infer differential treatment because: (1) a memorandum 
circulated by the associate principal at Templeton, Patty Polczynski, failed to address 
and condemn the widespread use by students of ‘hetero-sexist’ and ‘anti-gay’ 
comments in the same manner that a previous memorandum had done with respect to 
racist comments and symbols, and (2) while the Hamilton School District held several 
district-wide staff/teacher training sessions and conducted annual student orientation 
programs to implement its policies prohibiting race and sex discrimination, the district 
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that it was not enough for Schroeder to show that racial incidents were 
treated differently than those involving sexual orientation.  Instead, he 
needed to prove that he was treated differently from other teachers.114  
Unlike in Wendy Weaver’s case, where the court found significance in 
the fact that the district limited her speech and not the speech of 
heterosexual teachers, the acts of harassment in Schroeder resulted not 
from the district’s actions, but from its failure to act when presented 
with the actions of others (i.e. the often anonymous students and parents 
who victimized Schroeder).  Faced with no way to prove the absurd—
that the district had not failed to take the necessary steps to stop the 
harassment of heterosexual teachers—Schroeder attempted to show 
disparate treatment across classifications (i.e. race vs. sexual 
orientation).  But since courts apply strict scrutiny to racial 
classifications but only rational basis to sexual orientation—in effect 
placing more value on bigotry founded on race than bigotry founded on 
sexual orientation—the court was unimpressed.115  Richard Posner 
concurred specifically to make the point that even if Schroeder were 
right that the district handled racial harassment differently, he still could 
not prove that the state’s actions were “irrational.”116 
Rather than look comparatively to the manner in which the 
district treated various teachers, under the state’s interest prong the court 
majority found it appropriate to examine the district’s treatment of 
teachers against the interests of students, and it approached this 
comparison as a zero-sum game.  The court explicitly noted that “in a 
school setting, the well-being of students, not teachers, must be the 
primary concern of school administrators.”117  It found that young 
children are “more vulnerable to intimidation and mockery than 
teachers with advanced degrees and 20 years of experience,”118 and that 
school officials should be cautious about using “draconian”119 “police 
tactics”120 to remedy nonviolent harassment of a teacher by students, 
                                                 
 
never held similar training sessions or student programs to address sexual orientation 
discrimination.” Id. at 952.  
114 Id. 
115 “From a historical standpoint the core violation of the Equal Protection Clause is 
indeed the selective withdrawal of police protection from a disfavored group, as the 
term ‘equal protection of the laws’ connotes. . ..But Schroeder is no more a woman 
than he is a black.  He is a white male.”  Id. at 957. 
116 Id.  
117 Id. at 952.  Posner echoed these words in his concurrence: “a public school's 
primary commitment is to its students, not to its teachers.”  Id. at 958. 
118 Id. at 952. 
119 Id. at 956. 
120 Id. at 953. 
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“even though the harassment is offensive and cruel.”121  The court also 
assumed that the school could play no role in teaching tolerance because 
“it is hard to see how teaching the district's teachers and staff about 
sexual orientation discrimination would have prevented the primary 
perpetrators, the students and their parents, from harassing him.”122  It 
found that while the actions against Schroeder—which were punished 
when possible—were relevant, their “underlying motivation” was 
not.123 
The key to the legal blamelessness of the school district to stop 
the harassment, in the court’s eyes, was the school’s lack of control over 
parents.  “Obviously, if a child picks up foul language and prejudicial 
views from his parents at home, and then displays them at school, he 
should be disciplined,” Manion wrote.124  The court’s equation of 
prejudicial views with simple foul language treated the parent’s role in 
transmuting hatred as irrelevant to the assignation of blame.  In essence, 
the court vindicated parents’ fundamental right to instill bigotry in their 
children.  Despite the fact that none of the briefs mention religious 
freedom in the Schroeder case, Manion injected this concept into his 
thinking, writing that a student “cannot . . . be disciplined for expressing 
a home-taught religious belief that homosexual acts are immoral . . . the 
Equal Protection Clause does not require a school district to do anything 
about parental unpleasantries unless they take place on school 
grounds.”125 
Central to the court’s logic on all of these counts was the notion 
that there are simply not enough resources to stop the harassment of one 
teacher, regardless of its basis.  Because this appeared to be a single, 
isolated case, the Schroeder court cited Sixth Circuit precedent126 to say 
that the district had no obligation to get involved.127  In his concurrence, 
Judge Posner agreed, arguing that we simply don’t have time to protect 
                                                 
 
121 Id.  It is not clear to which tactics the court refers—presumably it means the 
sensitivity training that Schroeder requested. 
122 Id. at 954.  
123 Id. at 955.  Distinguishing Nabozny, a case of brutal student-on-student harassment 
that Schroeder cited in his brief, Posner pointed out that in Nabozny the assaults were 
physical and the neglect by school officials—who literally laughed when Nabozny 
complained—were easy to see.  Id. at 958-59. 
124 Id. at 955. 
125 Id. Ironically, later in its own opinion, the court warns against federal judges’ use 
of rational basis review as “a mechanism to impose their own social values on public 
school administrators who already have innumerable challenges to face.”  Id. at 956. 
126 Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 300-
01 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that Cincinnati had rational basis in conserving costs in 
passing Romer-like ban on rights for homosexuals). 
127 Schroeder, 282 F.3d at 954. 
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gay teachers, just as we can’t protect every “overweight, or undersized, 
or nerdish, or homely” employee.128  Moreover, according to Posner, for 
the district to have added a prohibition against anti-gay language in its 
memo to teachers at Schroeder’s school would have “diluted” the 
overall effect of the anti-bigotry message.129 
This barely-hidden disgust for homosexuality pervades 
Manion’s majority and Posner’s concurrence.  Both judgments equate 
sexual orientation with sexual acts in a circular argument that blames 
Schroeder for his own purported sexual promiscuity.  Manion found that 
“there is no simple way of explaining to young students why it is wrong 
to mock homosexuals without discussing the underlying lifestyle or 
sexual behavior associated with such a designation.”130  Posner referred 
to Schroeder’s sexual orientation or “activity,” which he said led to the 
school’s “understandable reticence about flagging issues of sex for 
children.”131  Both men’s words inject sexuality and sexual acts into 
Schroeder’s daily job performance and then lay the blame on Schroeder 
for their doing so, demonstrating their belief in what Nan Hunter calls 
“the intrinsic uncontrollability of gay male sexuality.”132  
The Seventh Circuit’s logic assumes that no student could 
understand what it means to love someone of the same sex because no 
student could possibly be gay.  It obliterates any sense that gay people 
are part of a community that includes non-gay people or that 
heterosexual members of that community might also benefit from 
stopping bigotry aimed at their friends, family, and colleagues.   It 
scrubs the history of gay rights from the possible list of classroom 
topics.  And it reflects an epistemological inability to conceive of sexual 
orientation apart from heterosexuality, grounded in a permanent 
stigmatization of homosexuals.  Put simply, the Schroeder opinion is a 
state vehicle for the very same bullying that Tommy Schroeder asked it 
to stop.  Writing in the 21st century, Posner and Manion echo ideology 
that is hundreds of years old in claiming that there is something unique 
in the homosexual “lifestyle.”  To speak of love, as is the most common 
way of explaining to children why coupledom of any kind occurs, 
appears beyond their vocabulary.  In one fell swoop, the Schroeder court 
                                                 
 
128 Id. at 958 (Posner, J., concurring). 
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130 Id. at 954.  To push Posner’s stance to its logical conclusion, one wonders whether, 
if we were talking about students who were harassing a female teacher who had just 
gotten married, it would be possible to explain that it was not okay to tease her without 
talking about sex.  
131 Id. at 958. 
132 Hunter, supra note 33, at 1607. 
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defined homosexual teachers and students out of full American 
citizenship.133 
 
V. LEGAL CONFUSION: JOAN LOVELL AND AN ELUSIVE HOSTILE 
WORK ENVIRONMENT 
 
The Schroeder opinion is valuable in that the men who wrote it 
had the courage to place their bold rationales in plain sight.  It stands as 
a symbol of a shockingly outdated sociolegal logic.  By contrast, the 
case of Joan Lovell illustrates what happens when courts with a genuine 
interest in stopping sexual orientation harassment reach, albeit 
unsuccessfully, for the legal backing to do so.  
Lovell worked as an art teacher for the Comsewogue school 
district in New York for 27 years without discussing her sexuality with 
anyone in the district.134  In 2001, three female students in her class 
complained that Lovell was “looking at them in a sexual manner or saw 
Lovell looking at one of their friends.”135  Lovell’s principal 
investigated the students’ claims, discovered them to be false, and 
transferred the students out of Lovell’s class.136  He also, however, gave 
one student a grade of 100% in Lovell’s class, and took no disciplinary 
action against the students.137  A number of incidents followed in which 
various students in the school harassed Lovell.  One called her a “dyke,” 
                                                 
 
133 Posner concluded that there was no evidence that the school authorities were hostile 
to Schroeder at all, let alone due to his sexual orientation “although the character of 
the defendants' response to his complaint may have been influenced by the hostility of 
some parents to the idea of their kids' being taught by a homosexual.”  Schroeder, 282 
F.3d at 957 (Posner, J., concurring).  Posner in particular, threw up his hands, writing 
that “while in hindsight it appears that the defendants could have done more to protect 
Schroeder from abuse,” there was no evidence there that the discrimination Schroeder 
suffered was “invidious or irrational.” Id. at 959 (Posner, J., concurring).  Judge Diane 
P. Wood, writing in dissent in Schroeder, harshly criticized the majority opinion: 
“Nothing in Romer justifies a system under which a state or state actors like the District 
and its officials deliberately either omit altogether or give a diminished form of legal 
protection from verbal or physical assaults to individuals in certain disfavored classes.  
Yet both the majority opinion and the concurrence see no problem in the fact that the 
defendants intentionally responded less vigorously to the abuse that finally broke 
Schroeder than they themselves would have done for others . . . The majority also 
makes the unwarranted factual finding that there was no evidence of hostility to 
Schroeder.  Even a glance at the facts the majority itself has set out shows that this is, 
at a minimum, a disputed point of fact.”  Id. at 961 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
134 Lovell v. Comsewogue Sch. Dist., No. CV 01 7750JO, 2005 WL 1398102, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2005). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at *2. 
137 Id. 
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another called her “disgusting,” students whispered and pointed at her 
as she walked through the halls, and two female students hugged each 
other in mock fear when they saw her.138  Still, her principal failed to 
take remedial measures.139  More incidents followed.  The principal 
suspended two students who asked Lovell whether she was a “dyke,” 
and told the full class that they were not to discuss the incident.140  
Another student called Lovell a “racist,” and when she sent him to the 
office, he responded that Lovell “just hate[s] men.”141  Finally, someone 
wrote “Lovell is a stupid dyke” on a desk.142  The principal called in the 
local police department’s Bias Crime Unit to investigate, but the 
perpetrator was never identified.143 
After a final incident in which a student falsely accused Lovell 
of telling the student to “go home and commit suicide” and a rumor 
spread in the student body that Lovell had been fired for doing so, Lovell 
saw the school doctor, who diagnosed her with anxiety and 
depression.144  Her own doctor diagnosed her with Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder resulting directly from the harassment.145  On June 30, 
2003, she went on catastrophic leave and did not return to school for the 
rest of the 2003-2004 school year.146  
Though Lovell brought her case no further than the district court, 
the Lovell opinion provides a synoptic catalogue of the enormous 
inconsistency and convoluted interpretations available in these 
circumstances.  The Lovell court’s explication of nearly every aspect of 
her case differed from the Seventh Circuit’s findings in Schroeder.  
First, even the basic equal protection analyses the two courts set up is 
dissimilar.  In framing the legal standards surrounding Lovell’s claim, 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
emphasized that to prove a violation by the district, Lovell must show 
that she was treated differently from other similarly-situated employees 
of the school on the basis of "impermissible considerations" or “by a 
malicious or bad faith intent to injure” her.147  Rather than take the 
Schroeder court’s approach and examine Lovell’s "membership” in a 
                                                 
 
138 Lovell v. Comsewogue Sch. Dist., 214 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
139 Id. 
140 Lovell v. Comsewogue Sch. Dist., No. CV 01 7750JO, 2005 WL 1398102, at *3 
(E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2005). 
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145 Id. at *4. 
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147 Lovell v. Comsewogue Sch. Dist., No. CV 01 7750JO, 2005 WL 1398102, at *8 
(E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2005) (citation omitted). 
2014]            THE LAST ACCEPTABLE PREJUDICE 91 
 
“class” of homosexuals, the Lovell court inquired whether Lovell's case 
was “sufficiently similar to others who were harassed by students, 
whether the defendants' handling of her situation was sufficiently 
different, and whether the explanation for any such difference is 
grounded in anti-homosexual animus. . .”148 On a motion for summary 
judgment, the court found that the answers to most of these questions 
could potentially come out in her favor and declined to grant summary 
judgment for the district.149 Where the Seventh Circuit in Schroeder 
decided as a question of law that sexual orientation and race were not 
comparable, the Lovell court held that these were issues a jury should 
decide.150 
Lovell’s central claim borrowed Title VII concepts to assert that 
her employers created a hostile work environment, but she brought her 
case under the Equal Protection Clause.151  This choice drew the court 
into opening a Pandora’s Box of conflicting and unsettled legal 
precedent leading to confusing results.  The likely reason Lovell 
implicitly invited the court to import Title VII hostile work analyses into 
her equal protection claim was to sidestep the fact that she was not a 
member of a protected class under Title VII.  Tommy Schroeder had 
attempted to make a similar connection in his own harassment case, 
which the Seventh Circuit rejected, calling it “a clear violation of the 
separation of powers.”152  
The Lovell court, however, entertained the idea.  In analyzing 
Lovell’s claims, it turned to several Title VII cases that center on sexual 
harassment and “because of sex” discrimination, not specifically on 
sexual orientation harassment.  For example, in Quinn v. Nassau County 
Police Department, which the Lovell court cited,153 a New York district 
court found that a police department had fostered a hostile work 
environment by failing to protect a gay officer from harassment.154  The 
harassment, however, was sexual in nature, and the court specifically 
identified it as such, saying “the Second Circuit has explained that 
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151 Id. at *5-*6. 
152 “Schroeder attempts to side-step this analysis completely by inviting us to ‘hold 
explicitly that Title VII analysis/law shall apply in § 1983 cases where discrimination 
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153 Lovell v. Comsewogue Sch. Dist., 214 F. Supp. 2d 319, 323 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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sexual harassment can, under certain circumstances, amount to a 
constitutional tort.”155  In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., on the other 
hand, the Supreme Court heard the case of a plaintiff who brought a 
Title VII “because of sex” case to stem discrimination on the basis of 
her identity as a woman.156  Lovell looked to this precedent to examine 
the extent to which the environment Lovell faced was severe or 
hostile.157 Finally, in Annis v. County of Westchester, the Second Circuit 
appeared to hold that plaintiffs suing under Section 1983 may import 
hostile work environment analyses from Title VII.158  The Lovell court 
cited Annis to conclude that “it is well established in this circuit that sex-
based discrimination, including sexual harassment, is actionable under 
§ 1983 as a violation of equal protection.”159  The Lovell court drew on 
this variety of precedents to completely tangle the important legal and 
experiential distinctions between sexual harassment, sex-based 
discrimination, and sexual orientation harassment. 
Despite the court’s confusion, Lovell contains the only attempt 
to articulate a legal standard to analyze cases in which students harass 
teachers on the basis of sexual orientation.  In its review, the court turned 
to another New York case, Peries v. New York City Board of Education, 
which involved a Title VII claim brought by a teacher of Sri Lankan 
descent whose students harassed him for nearly a decade based on his 
national origin and race.160  The Peries court found that the authority of 
administrators relative to teachers in stemming student abuse was an 
issue of first impression.161  While Peries pointed out that the Supreme 
Court had ruled in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education that 
administrators might be liable if they failed to take action to stop 
                                                 
 
155 Id. at 356.  “In the Court's view, the United States Constitution and the provisions 
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, combined with logic, common sense and fairness dictate the 
answer: individuals have a constitutional right under the Equal Protection Clause to be 
free from sexual orientation discrimination causing a hostile work environment in 
public employment.”  Id. at 350. 
156 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 18-19 (1993). 
157 Lovell, 2005 WL 1398102, at *8. 
158 “We therefore hold that an employment discrimination plaintiff alleging the 
violation of a constitutional right may bring suit under § 1983 alone, and is not required 
to plead concurrently a violation of Title VII.  While we share the district court's 
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instance in the district courts, that is a policy matter outside our province.”  Annis v. 
County of Westchester, N.Y., 36 F.3d 251, 255 (2d Cir. 1994). 
159 Lovell v. Comsewogue Sch. Dist., 214 F. Supp. 2d 319, 323 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
160 For example, his students called him a “fucking Hindu” and asked him, “why are 
you here?  You go home.” 
Peries v. New York City Bd. of Educ., No. 97 CV 7109(ARR), 2001 WL 1328921, at 
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2001). 
161 Id. at *5. 
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student-on-student sexual harassment, “neither the Supreme Court nor 
the Second Circuit has extended that right to teachers.”162  The Peries 
court distinguished student-on-student harassment and student-on-
teacher harassment, finding that the most important distinction between 
them is that “a victim student has no disciplinary authority over the 
harassing student, while a victim teacher wields at least nominal 
disciplinary authority.”163  The Peries court found it “conceivable” that 
school officials owed a higher duty of protection to students than to 
teachers, but also asserted that administrators have more power than 
teachers to discipline and control students.164  Peries thus held that, 
although administrators “should be” required to stem student-on-teacher 
harassment, the administration defendants were not given sufficient 
notice to be held liable.165  Therefore, they were entitled to qualified 
immunity from Section 1983.166  In other words, the Peries court found 
that school administrations have a limited duty to protect their 
employees from student harassment, even for teachers whose 
identities—racial and national in Peries’ case—are explicitly protected 
by Title VII. 
 The Peries opinion appeared to heavily influence Lovell.  The 
Lovell court distinguished the conduct of the students from that of the 
administration, finding that Lovell would have to show that her 
administrators subjected her to discrimination and a hostile work 
environment.167  It was not enough to demonstrate that the students 
created a hostile work environment motivated by animus and that the 
administration did not sufficiently protect Lovell.168  Rather, she would 
have to prove that her principal also was motivated by animus, “because 
even if he did not know in 2001 that he had to protect Lovell against the 
students' discrimination, he is presumed to have known of his obligation 
not to engage in such discrimination himself.”169  In making the claim 
that the administration would not have known, absent a Supreme Court 
holding, that it had a duty to protect its employees from harassment no 
matter the identity of the aggressor, the Lovell court in effect set up a 
double burden: to pursue successful harassment claims based on 
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(1999). 
163 Peries, 2001 WL 1328921, at *6. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at *8. 
166 Id. 
167 Lovell v. Comsewogue Sch. Dist., No. CV 01 7750JO, 2005 WL 1398102, at *10 
(E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2005). 
168 Lovell v. Comsewogue Sch. Dist., 214 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
169 Id. 
94     Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice     [Vol. 3:1 
 
harassment by students, gay teachers will have to show animus in both 
the students and the school officials.170  
 The propensity in the law to view students as innocent and 
passive actors in these cases obstructs teacher claims in another 
important aspect.  In Peries, multiple students harassed the plaintiff over 
a long period of time, and the school defendants claimed the diffuse 
nature of the harassment as a defense, arguing, in the words of the court, 
that “Dr. Peries submitted a small number of complaints about many 
different students, but not enough complaints about any one student to 
merit taking serious action such as suspension.”171  Essentially, the logic 
the defendants asserted hinged on the assumption that teachers carry 
pervasive moral authority at all times and in all situations.  The way to 
stop this behavior was simply to discipline the individual actors 
responsible.  If the teacher could not handle the harassment, that said 
more about the teacher than the student perpetrators or adult 
administrators.  If the conduct came from many corners, it was not as 
valid.  In fact, the more serious and widespread the student-led 
harassment became, the more insulated the school was from its 
responsibility to remedy it.  Luckily for Dr. Peries, the court did not 
wholly accept this argument, but instead held that the extent to which 
the school took appropriate action to stop the harassment was a question 
of fact for a jury.172 
 The Peries court held that, under Title VII, student harassment 
of teachers should be analyzed using a standard similar to that used for 
employees harassed by their employers’ customers.173  The Peries court 
cited EEOC guidance to find that the degree of responsibility an 
employer carries towards its employees is assessed based on whether 
the employer “knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to 
take immediate and appropriate corrective action.”174  The EEOC 
identifies the key factors in assessing employer responsibility as “the 
extent of the employer's control and any other legal responsibility which 
the employer may have with respect to the conduct of such non-
employees.”175  It also pledges to look “at the entire record: including 
the nature of the conduct, and the context in which the alleged incidents 
occurred.  A determination of whether harassment is severe or pervasive 
enough to be illegal is made on a case-by-case basis.”176 
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 This standard is potentially useful in placing an onus on school 
administrations to take effective action to stem student-on-teacher 
harassment generally, but it remains a part of Title VII.  Lovell’s 
importation of Title VII standards into her sexual orientation case will 
likely not pass muster in most courts.  Her legal creativity has logical, 
not legal, force.  Further, while the Peries standard is compelling, it 
explicitly welcomes a discussion of control, and cases like Tommy 
Schroeder’s demonstrate the landmines there.  The Supreme Court itself 
has declared that schools do not control students, teachers do: “A public 
school does not control its students in the way it controls its teachers or 
those with whom it contracts.  Most public schools do not screen or 
select students, and their power to discipline students is far from 
unfettered.”177  The logic here is that schools control teachers and 
teachers control students.  Therefore, if teachers cannot control students, 
teachers themselves are fully responsible.  Schools have only a limited 
duty to control or stop student harassers.  
If this calculation seems odd, the addition of sexual orientation 
turns it bitter.  The long history of stereotypes and bigotry described 
above means that sexual orientation harassment presents a unique trap 
that anti-gay forces seize to validate stereotypes and perpetuate 
intolerance.  Namely, a teacher who complains about treatment from 
students obviously cannot control them.  It is a weakness to lose control 
of kids and by extension represents a lack of ability of gay and lesbian 
people to be parents—the “effeminate bachelor” and “recruitment” 
tropes updated for the 21st century.  This ideology teaches children that 
gay people are not worthy of respect and therefore cannot properly 
exercise authority.  It is the bully’s mentality burned directly into the 
law: first you cannot control these kids, and now you want to cry about 
it?178  
 The patchwork of legal remedies sought by Schroeder and 
Lovell makes plain the legal inadequacy in this area.  Plaintiffs 
shouldn’t have to put together a Frankenstein monster of precedents and 
theories to achieve recognition of their basic rights by schools, parents, 
and students themselves.  The fact that both Tommy Schroeder and Joan 
Lovell tried to import parts of Title VII into their claims for equal 
protection demonstrates the need for federal anti-discrimination 
protection.  It is at best ironic and at worst conspiratorial that the 
Schroeder court conflated sexual orientation with sexuality when 
assessing classroom culture but made an erudite and nuanced distinction 
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between those notions in its legal analysis.179  Schroeder, the court 
seemed to say, was only entitled to his identity if it was a problem.  The 
power of the state only went as far as protecting others from him.  
Lovell, on the other hand, was the victim of a school system that simply 
had no clear idea of its responsibility to her.  Had her skin been another 
color, had the epithets used against her been tinged with a different 
history of oppression, then perhaps the injuries she suffered would have 
been recognized as worth remedying. 
 
VI. (OUT) (OF) CONTROL: TORT LAW’S ENVISAGING OF CHILDREN, 
PARENTS, AND SCHOOLS  
 
The sections above demonstrate that, in many ways, 
constitutional and civil rights laws are inadequate to render justice 
because they largely vacate the responsibility of school officials for 
stopping harassment.  This section looks at whether tort claims present 
a successful avenue for addressing student-on-teacher harassment.  
Suits in tort often present victims who have not found redress in other 
legal areas with an outlet for remedies.  Tort law has two central aims: 
first, to inject the actions of people with moral liability and to impose 
monetary sanctions when it is right to do so, and second, to promote 
social policy that is good not just for the individual wronged, but for 
society as a whole.180  In situations of student-on-teacher harassment, 
neither conception prevails.  While civil rights violations are torts,181 
culpability does not necessarily follow.  Because of the numerous 
intersecting doctrines necessary to assign liability for non-physical torts 
committed in school, and the high bar they present in combination, it 
appears that tort claims for negligence or intentional infliction of 
emotional distress (IIED) do not offer a reliable avenue for relief. 
IIED is the most likely tort a teacher who is a victim of student 
harassment might rely upon.  In allowing IIED claims generally, public 
policy recognizes intangible harms such as distress, emotional harm, 
anxiety, diminished enjoyment, and loss of autonomy.182  These torts 
represent “the antithesis of happiness or enjoyment of life which 
everyone pursues.”183  The conduct alleged in an IIED claim must be 
outrageous.184  The only case where a gay teacher who had been 
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harassed brought claims for IIED was in Murray v. Oceanside Unified 
School District.185  However, in this case it was Dawn Murray’s fellow 
employees, not her students, who were the perpetrators.186  The only 
question before the California appellate court that heard her case was 
whether her claims for IIED were barred by workers’ compensation 
laws.187  The Murray court held that harassment on the basis of sexual 
orientation is outside the normal employment environment and, if it is 
sufficiently outrageous, is analogous to sexual harassment because they 
both “[exceed] all bounds of decency usually tolerated by a decent 
society.”188  The fact that students were uninvolved in the harassment, 
however, makes this a limited victory for the types of plaintiffs central 
to the discussion here.  
An example of the challenge involved for teachers in bringing 
IIED claims for student-on-teacher harassment outside the school 
environment is found in a 2008 decision by the Texas Court of Appeals.  
In Draker v. Schreiber, a vice-principal brought suit against two of her 
students after the students created a fake social media site in her name 
that made lewd sexual comments and, among numerous graphic 
references, implied that she was a lesbian.189  After discovering the site, 
Draker became worried about the public exposure of her name and 
information, given its connection to the lewd material, and experienced 
various health problems.190  She alleged defamation and IIED against 
the students, and negligence and gross negligence against the parents.191  
She lost on all counts.192  
The court held that, in Texas, IIED is a “gap-filler” tort, meaning 
that it is only available in “those rare instances in which a defendant 
intentionally inflicts severe emotional distress in a manner so unusual 
that the victim has no other recognized theory of redress.”193  IIED 
claims in Texas cannot arise out of the factual basis for any other 
claim.194  Draker could not employ any of the facts from her defamation 
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claim, which she lost on summary judgment, to assert IIED.195  Justice 
Catherine Stone wrote a scathing concurring opinion to the decision in 
which she decried the conduct of the students in the case as 
“outrageous” but lamented that “there is no civil legal consequence for 
the unacceptable conduct.  The lack of a consequence is because, in 
Texas, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists only 
in theory.”196  Texans, she wrote, “would be better served by a fair and 
workable framework in which to present their claims, or by an honest 
statement that there is, in fact, no remedy for their damages.”197  
IIED can, in theory, be employed against parents when they use 
their children198 as proxies to inflict harm against others.  In Segal v. 
Lynch, a father filed a tort claim against his child’s mother for IIED, 
charging that the mother had “engaged in extreme and outrageous 
conduct designed to poison his relationship with his children. . .”199 
Essentially, the father claimed that the mother used the children as a tool 
to inflict distress upon him.200  A New Jersey appellate court affirmed 
the trial court’s dismissal of the action, holding that the plaintiff’s claim 
was barred because it was not in the best interests of the child, but also 
affirming that the plaintiff father had “advanced a good faith argument 
in support of his legal position in a novel, complex, and heretofore 
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relatively unexplored area of the law.”201  To date, it does not appear 
that any teacher has sued any parent for employing a child as a tool of 
bigotry.  However, the notion that children are, as Steven K. Homer has 
written, “unregulated conduits of society’s homophobia,” presents a 
novel way of examining the ideological relationship between parents 
and their children.202 
Another possible avenue for teachers seeking protection from 
student harassment under tort law is through negligence actions brought 
against school administrations.  Under the doctrine of in loco parentis, 
schools have a duty to exercise the same degree of care toward their 
students as would a reasonably prudent parent.203  However, schools are 
only liable for injuries that are foreseeable and that are related to the 
absence of adequate supervision.204  In this sense, under tort law, 
schools are not the “insurers of safety” for students.205  However, 
negligence doctrine does appear to acknowledge a stronger connection 
between the actions of schools and students than does, for example, Title 
VII jurisprudence.  
The status of parents under tort law in general is a linchpin for 
analyzing negligence within schools.  Under common law, parents are 
not necessarily vicariously responsible for the actions of their 
children.206  However, a parent may be liable for the actions of a child 
that the parent fails to control, even if the child is not subject to 
liability.207  In essence, the younger and more impressionable the child, 
the more control the parent theoretically has to influence the child.208  
Nonetheless, parental liability is often more theoretical than real.  Even 
in cases where minor children have committed violent offenses, courts 
have not been quick to assign liability to adults for negligent 
supervision.209  To face liability, parents must know of the specific 
propensity and occasion of the child’s actions.210  It is not enough if the 
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parents know merely that the child is dangerous; they are liable only if 
they are negligent in failing to control their children or warn others.211  
Courts recognize that teenagers need freedom to develop and consider 
older children more difficult to control and more responsible for their 
own actions than younger children.212  Thus, the parents of high school 
age students are less likely to face liability for the actions of their 
children, despite the fact that older children are, in many ways, more 
able to inflict emotional damage.213  No matter the age, it is extremely 
rare that civil responsibility is assigned to students themselves, 
especially for non-violent offenses.214 
The difficulty in assigning tort liability against minors is only 
exacerbated in the classroom context.  For example, in Dinardo v. City 
of New York, a special education teacher brought a negligence action 
against the city and city board of education seeking damages for 
physical injuries she sustained in trying to break up an altercation 
between students.215  The teacher, Zelinda Dinardo, had complained for 
months to the school that one of the students had been “verbally and 
physically aggressive” and expressed concerns for her own safety in the 
classroom.216  Her supervisor and principal assured her that “things were 
being worked on, things were happening” and told her to “hang in there 
because something was being done.”217  The New York Court of 
Appeals held that the school’s assurances were too vague to result in a 
justifiable reliance by Dinardo.218  The court cited the fact that there was 
an ongoing administrative process at the time of the incident as evidence 
of Dinardo’s lack of legal recourse.219  Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman 
reluctantly concurred, citing a recent New York case that held that 
government action must be ministerial, not discretionary, to form the 
basis for tort liability.220  He acknowledged the severity of the facts: the 
student had threatened to kill the plaintiff and other students, and 
Dinardo testified that she wanted to quit as a result of the dangerous 
classroom situation.221  Chief Judge Lippman also emphasized the 
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existence of a special relationship between teacher and supervisors.222  
Liability in this case, he found, was “entirely consistent with the general 
tort principle that a defendant should be held liable for the breach of a 
duty it voluntarily assumed.”223 
Even in cases where the student’s victims have faced severe 
physical harm, tort liability has been elusive.224  Proximate causation 
may be difficult to prove, debates arise about whether a duty exists,225 
claims are barred as a matter of law,226 immunities are assigned,227 and 
various technicalities stand in the way.228  For teachers who have been 
“merely” verbally abused, as in the cases of Tommy Schroeder and Joan 
Lovell, neither IIED claims against parents nor negligence actions 
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against schools offer promising avenues to relief.  The liability of 
children themselves is also extremely tricky.  Dobbs Law of Torts 
describes the children’s standard of liability as “almost no standard at 
all; it holds the child to whatever he can reasonably do, perhaps best 
indicated by what he in fact has done.”229  As in other parts of the law, 
tort jurisprudence assumes that children are in need of protection; it is 
extremely difficult to paint children as perpetrators.  Children, like their 
parents, are also often judgment-proof.230  The amalgamation of these 
standards means that the deterrent function inherent in tort-based civil 
protections does not apply to students who clearly see that the 
consequences for their homophobic but non-violent actions will result 
in, at worst, a few days off school.231  
 
VII. THE DIALECTICAL CREATION OF SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP 
The key to understanding the unique topography of the 
secondary classroom is to recognize both the vulnerability of young 
people and their power.  Children are vulnerable because they emulate 
and look up to adults, whom they trust.  They are powerful because they 
influence adults with their behavior, and because they will soon become 
adults themselves.  They are not-yet fully formed individuals, but they 
are still key members of social communities and discourse.  They act 
and they are acted upon, they destroy and create, they take power for 
themselves and they give it away easily.  Unfortunately, the law is often 
unable to reflect the complexity of this distinctiveness.  It treats students 
simply as innocent pawns, vessels that absorb what they are taught, 
young and burgeoning minds in need, merely, of protection.  It seems 
easier for our criminal system to think of a seventeen-year old murderer 
as an adult than it does a seventeen-year old bully in school.  
The law also does not effectively understand secondary teachers.  
It applies to them legal standards developed mostly for students or for 
higher education.232  While the law recognizes that in some sense a 
teacher’s most basic job is to endure various types of mundane 
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harassment on a daily basis, it is unable to assess when a line has been 
crossed.233  In a school, it is the adults’ job to demonstrate to students 
the borders of acceptability.  However, this does not mean students 
should not be expected to conform to those perimeters.  Teenagers 
understand that they are not held fully responsible for their actions, and 
they are experts at exploiting that position of power.  The line between 
acceptable and unacceptable in a public school—between “kids being 
kids,” and kids ruining the lives of adults—should not apply differently 
to teachers according to their privilege or identity.  
The evidence above demonstrates that parents essentially 
possess the right to teach their children whatever they want.  As they 
worry aloud about teachers’ purported influence, some parents exploit 
the formative identity of children by closing their minds to tolerance.  
The law shields these children when victims seek accountability.  
Thankfully, however, children are not just vessels to be filled.  They are 
also vehicles for changing the beliefs and attitudes of their parents.  
They can be liberalizers and liberators from outdated ideologies.  
Kenneth Karst writes that older children are often “agents of change” 
who can threaten the parent's own identity, as invested in the child.234  
Karst describes how young people can “culturally emigrate” from 
“parents' morality, from the authority of meanings the parents have 
assigned to behavior, even from the parents' religion and their other 
group identities.”235  
Such a process is presently underway nationwide.  Many in the 
current generation of teenagers, which contains more openly gay 
individuals than any of its predecessors, feel they can only express their 
openness while at school.236  (Conversely, the student perpetrators of 
sexual orientation abuse have likely not been able to escape the 
imprisoning ideology of home; they carry their cage to school).  The 
fact that they are out for even some portion of their daily lives 
contributes to the massive improvement in attitudes towards 
homosexuality underway in our society.237  In many ways, children—
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who are elastic, creative, and open—are better equipped than adults to 
be the frontline troops in the war on homophobia and heterosexism. 
While most of this paper has focused on the ways in which the 
law leaves teachers powerless (as one commentator smirked, “If 
teachers had such power over children, I would have been a nun years 
ago”),238 teachers, of course, do influence students.  All teachers, no 
matter their sexual orientation, are, in the words of Theresa Bryant, 
“critical front-line soldiers in any effort at tolerance education.”239  It 
cannot be emphasized enough that tolerance is not just a gay issue.  
When bigotry prevails in the classroom, everyone loses.  A student 
struggling with her own sexual identity and orientation suffers from 
witnessing the harassment of a teacher, a straight student must cope with 
classmates who express confusing and cruel viewpoints, and the child 
with gay parents at home closets her joy and love for her family.240  The 
new freedoms claimed by many young people in the internet age also 
provide solace and motivation for teachers who did not grow up with 
those same opportunities.  Students and adults collaborate to make 
schools safe places for all community members. 
Today’s Anita Bryants must style their superstitions under false 
fronts.  It is a sign of improvement that today’s anti-gay movement 
publicly worries less that gayness will transfer from teacher to student 
and more about broader issues such as “procreation” or “family values.”  
Today’s anti-gay forces fear that gay people will become an accepted 
part of the larger social conversation.  They dread that full acceptance 
of gay teachers means ascribing inherent value to homosexuality and 
making it something that we could actually want to develop in our 
children.241  If gay young people don’t exist, then gay role models don’t 
either; attempts to maintain the closet for teachers are also efforts to 
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destroy the evolution of the values of tolerance on a broader scale.242  If 
there is one idea anti-gay forces do not accept, it is not whether gay 
people exist (there is treatment for that243), but that being gay can be 
fabulous.  To combine the joy of youth with a security in being 
homosexual is powerfully threatening to those who cling to a rigid 
homophobic standard.  Two years before Stonewall, the United States 
Supreme Court spoke triumphantly of the “marketplace of ideas” on 
which “the Nation's future depends.”244  We should champion this idea, 
even if the celebration of homosexuality is likely not what the Court—
historically white, male, and ostensibly heterosexual—had in mind.  The 
cultivation of authentically democratic schools, where development of 
healthy gender identity, sexuality, and sexual orientation is encouraged, 
threatens established power structures and pushes equality forward in 
electrifying directions.  
 
VIII. THE ROAD AHEAD: RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
Most federal sources of school law perpetuate the closet.  
Federal courts have promoted “doctrinal unpredictability and 
inconsistency”245 in free expression and equal protection violations 
when it comes to sexual orientation, and they have utterly muddled their 
interpretations of Title VII “because of sex” discrimination.  The United 
States Congress declines, year after year, to ratify the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act, which would protect employees in large 
workplaces from discrimination based on their sexual orientation.246  
Only state non-discrimination statutes currently offer any relief to 
public employees, including teachers, for harassment based on sexual 
orientation.247  For a right as fundamental as the need to feel safe and 
secure at work and to be free from open persecution based on an 
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essential piece of human identity, state residence should not determine 
the chance for relief.  Too many states abdicate their responsibility as 
gatekeepers of fundamental rights for gay and lesbian people.  We need 
federal protections for public employees in all states.  Until we ratify a 
national law like the Employment Non Discrimination Act or add sexual 
orientation as a classification protected under Title VII, we will continue 
to fail teachers by perpetuating “the last acceptable prejudice.”248  
One central question that remains unresolved is why there have 
been so few plaintiffs bringing student-on-teacher harassment cases.249  
The easiest explanation, of course, is that there have been few incidents.  
As tempting as this conclusion may be, embracing it ignores the larger 
cultural forces surrounding this issue.  Suzanne Eckes and Mary 
McCarthy suggest three reasons why there have not been more cases 
recently challenging the rights of GLBT educators in general.  First, 
information on reasons for a teacher’s dismissal or “voluntary” 
resignation is not readily available, especially for non-tenured school 
personnel.250  Second, most cases settle out of court and do not provide 
a paper trail.  Third, state and local anti-discrimination protections for 
sexual orientation are successful in preventing harassment and 
discrimination.251  I suggest, additionally, that the historical legal terrain 
in the United States sends a clear message to potential plaintiffs that the 
law is stacked against them.  As delineated above, statutes do not apply, 
precedents do not fit, and courts are at best confused and at worst 
homophobic.  Class and racial issues also likely contribute.252  
Moreover, as Eva DuBuisson writes, when schools are successful in 
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preventing speech by teachers, the result is silence.253  A lack of 
litigation does not equate to widespread tolerance or success in the 
safeguarding of civil rights in this area. 
 The best way to solve this issue is for Congress to revise the 
Civil Rights Act by adding sexual orientation protections to Title VII.  
This solution is the most direct and comprehensive way to provide 
fundamental rights nationwide, ensure that gay teachers are free of 
harassment and discrimination, and make certain that all students have 
access to inclusive curriculums.  Because Title VII reform is highly 
unlikely, we must rely on other important advances, most pertinently 
state and local anti-discrimination statutes.  These laws, based on Title 
VII but with added protections based on sexual orientation and in some 
states also gender identity, provide strong safeguards.  They are 
problematic, however, because they determine fundamental protections 
based on state citizenship.254  Smaller improvements, such as the 
elimination of morality clauses from teacher contracts, the inclusion of 
union-backed anti-discrimination clauses, and public awareness 
campaigns also contribute.255  
 The impassioned fight for gay marriage also plays a role in 
ushering in new rights to LGBT educators, even as the marriage debate 
obscures other equality strategies.  Despite the recent landmark 
Supreme Court decisions in Windsor256 and Perry,257 the classroom is 
still a flourishing centerpiece of conservative notions about gay identity.  
(If we compare Brown v. Board of Education258 and Loving v. 
Virginia259—which came fourteen years later—LGBT activists may 
have confused the proper order here260).  As many commentators have 
pointed out, there are drawbacks to the placement of marriage at the 
head of the civil rights agenda.261  While marriage is the “organizing 
and stabilizing institution of society,”262 it is also a milieu where 
heterosexuals receive a specific and identifiable privilege based on their 
sexual orientation.  In schools, by contrast, heterosexual people receive 
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various advantages, yet their entitlement pervades invisibly.  The lack 
of explicit recognition of heterosexual privilege in schools means that 
the optics of equal protection challenges are less profitable for teachers 
than for gay spouses in marriage cases.  The disparate treatment across 
classifications is also much less stark for Schroeder and Lovell than for 
Perry and Windsor.  This is why, in the post-Lawrence legal landscape, 
we think of gay people as autonomous adults deserving of rights when 
we talk about marriage, but that image instantly vanishes when we think 
of gay people as teachers. 
 The risk for teachers of bringing challenges is also higher than 
for marriage advocates.  The fact that every one of the teachers who 
have brought lawsuits in this study had at least fifteen years of teaching 
experience probably indicates both the necessary background for 
plaintiffs and the exhilaration that comes with pent-up honesty.  Like 
John Lawrence and Michael Hardwick, Tommy Schroeder and Joan 
Lovell were average citizens who chose to fight back when 
challenged.263  For teachers of any stripe, however, job security is not a 
given, especially in the political climate of the present day.264  Courts 
are a theoretical refuge, but in reality they may be even less protective 
than schools.  To secure victory, plaintiffs need highly favorable facts 
that are not usually available.  Teachers pay a disproportionate price for 
hard won advances that do not appear, as does marriage, on CNN.  The 
threat of being fired is still high enough to keep gay teachers on notice 
that it is more expedient to carefully cover their sexual orientation than 
to embody it.265  A teacher cannot come out of a closet that is locked 
from the outside.  The closet holds such enormous power because it is 
imposed, not chosen.  Schools are therefore an example of a locus where 
current strategies around LGBT equality are muted in favor of a cautious 
incrementalism.266  It is no accident that all of the test cases in this area 
emerge from venues north of the Mason-Dixon Line. 
 The tendency of those who see schools as strategic battlegrounds 
for gay and lesbian civil rights is to play a waiting game.  Since tolerance 
of homosexuality is undergoing a revolution, it makes sense in some 
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ways not to fight too hard for tolerance right now, given that younger 
generations are becoming increasingly tolerant, and the views of the 
nation as a whole are shifting.  But before we surrender further ground 
in the classroom, it is worth re-examining the lives of our advance 
troops.  We should think about what working conditions we want for 
gay people and what values we want to inculcate in our youth rather 
than looking to the law to form our social values.  Cultural forces in 
public spaces of discourse like classrooms are infinitely more powerful 
than the ability of the law to maintain pace with the changing times.267  
Recently, Jason Collins, a center in the National Basketball Association, 
announced that he is gay.  He became the first professional athlete 
currently playing in one of the four professional sports to do so.  In a 
beautifully written article in Sports Illustrated, Collins explained that he 
was inspired by President Obama's mentioning of the Stonewall riots in 
his second inaugural address, and also by “the grade-school teacher who 
encourages her students to accept the things that make us different.”268  
If the goal is still that classrooms are incubators of democracy,269 then 
we should be sure to fulfill that promise for our teachers as well.  
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